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Introduction
Many believe that the current USA military retirement system– 
a defined benefit with a 20 years-of-service (YOS) cliff-vest– is more 
expensive than necessary to maintain the all-volunteer force. The 
proposed solution is the Modernized Retirement System (MRS), which 
reduces the defined benefit (still vesting at 20 YOS), introduces a defined 
contribution for all service members, and allows for a continuation 
bonus at YOS 12. The MRS will be mandatory for personnel hired as of 
2018, and it will be optional for personnel with 12 YOS or less in 2017. 
The MRS is expected to considerably reduce Department of 
Defense retirement costs without affecting employee turnover [1]. 
The assumption about turnover is of fundamental importance because 
replacing and training personnel in the USA military is costly, owing 
to the lack of lateral entry and significant general and on-the-job 
training. The main changes under the MRS will likely have opposite 
effects on service members’ labor decisions: the introduction of defined 
contributions and the continuation bonus may induce longer job 
tenure, but the reduction in pension payments may induce people to 
separate earlier1. In this paper, we provide the first empirical estimates 
of the retention impacts of the MRS. We surveyed members of the 
USA Marine Corps to elicit their expected length of service under each 
system, and whether they would opt-in to the MRS. Responses suggest 
that there will be a small increase in retention rates of enlisted personnel 
in the early-career years; for officers, retention will be similar up to 12 
YOS, at which point there will be a considerable decrease in retention 
rates under the MRS. These findings are in contrast to the simulations 
[1], who conclude that retention rates would not appreciably change 
under the MRS; furthermore, despite the fact that our data reflect 
stated preferences and not actual choices, these findings echo the actual 
retention behavior of Australian military members who made a similar 
choice between a defined benefit and defined contribution retirement 
scheme in the 1990s [2]. This paper also contributes to the broader 
empirical literature on choices in military retirement systems [2-4].
The Retirement Systems 
We briefly describe the retirement systems; for full details refer to 
MCRMC (2015) [5]. The current system (High-3/Redux). The current 
retirement system is a pension that vests after 20 YOS. The defined 
benefit is the average of the final three years of basic pay multiplied 
by an index for each YOS; this index is determined by a choice the 
individual made at 15 YOS, between the High-3 and Redux plans. The 
High-3 index is 2.5%, while the Redux index is 2% for the first 20 YOS, 
3.5% for the next 10 YOS, and 2.5% for each YOS thereafter. At age 62, 
Redux payments are increased to match what they would have been 
under High-3. The compensation for the lower initial Redux multiplier 
is a $30,000 bonus at YOS 15. 
Members can also contribute to the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), 
a tax-deferred savings plan with a broad menu of investment funds. 
There are currently no government contributions into the TSP.
The new system (MRS)
The MRS has four components: (i) a defined benefit vesting at 20 
YOS equal to the average of the final three years of basic pay multiplied 
by 2% per YOS; (ii) a government TSP contribution for all members 
equal to 1% of basic pay and, after the second YOS, a government match 
of individual TSP contributions up to 4% of basic pay; (iii) a bonus 
of 2.5 times monthly basic pay at 12 YOS; and (iv) retirees may elect 
to receive a portion of future pension payments upon retirement in 
exchange for lower pension payments. 
The transition period
Individuals who join as of January 1, 2018 will be enrolled in the 
MRS. As of that date, current military members with over 12 YOS will 
be grandfathered into the current plan and those with 12 YOS or less 
will have the choice to opt-in to the MRS or stay with the current system.
For individuals, the MRS dominates the current system for YOS less 
than 20. With 20 or more YOS, the superiority of the MRS is a function 
of years served and the TSP balance (which is, in turn, a function of 
individual contributions and the choice of investment fund). However, 
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the 2015 MCRMC report suggests the MRS will dominate for most 
individuals: it includes one illustrative example of an MRS member 
who contributes 3% of basic pay to a diversified stock TSP fund (in 
total investing 7% of basic pay) and will likely have a total discounted 
retirement package at 20 YOS worth about 15% more than the 
discounted value of the comparable High-3 plan. On the other hand, 
this example does not consider the possibility that private investments 
made by service members affect their retirement decisions2.
For the government, the MRS is expected to lower expenditures 
on retirement because the reduction in future pension payments will 
likely be less than governmental TSP matching contributions and the 
12 YOS retention bonus [1,5]. However, if the MRS increases turnover, 
recruiting and training costs will also increase. 
Sample 
We designed an online survey that first explained the features and 
monetary payoffs of the current and new retirement systems and then 
elicited respondent’s expected YOS under each system. We also asked 
whether they would opt in to the MRS3.
Our survey population was the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I 
MEF). A MEF is a fully independent war-fighting body and is the most 
representative unit of the Marine Corps. In turn, the Marine Corps 
exhibits features of the other USA armed forces in terms of occupations, 
as it contains air, land, and sea forces, as well as noncombat supporting 
units (e.g., administrative, maintenance, and supply) [6]. Nevertheless, 
the USA marines have special characteristics that might reduce the 
external validity of our results for the whole USA military, such as the 
facts that the former have a unique organizational culture, are located 
mainly on the coast, and have more rigorous selection criteria. 
We emailed the survey in February 2016 to the 28,054 I MEF 
marines who will have 12 YOS or less as of January 01, 2018, 1,948 
individuals responded, and we merged responses with demographic 
data from administrative records. 
Table 1 contains summary statistics of respondents and non-
respondents. Column 1 shows that 90% of respondents are male, 41% 
are single, 23% are officers, the average age is 26.43 years, the average 
YOS is 7.89, 81% are White, and the majority (52%) are in combat 
service support occupations. Comparing with Column 2, it seems that 
our sample is over-represented by officers, who are more likely to be 
married, older, and have more YOS (also, a college degree is required 
to be an officer). For this reason, we separate our analysis below by 
officers and enlisted personnel. One concern for the external validity of 
our results is that individuals with a heightened interest in retirement 
issues might have been more inclined to take the survey; however, we 
do not believe there is any particular reason to suspect that selection 
into taking the survey is correlated with preference for the new or the 
old system. 
Results and Discussion
We first describe members’ preference for opting-in to the MRS 
through probit regressions. Column 1 of Table 2 shows the opt-in rate is 
32.6% overall, and that officers are 61% less likely to opt-in than enlisted 
personnel. Females, both officers and enlisted, are more likely to select 
MRS (albeit with marginal significance), the best option for parents 
who expect to leave service to raise children. As expected, those with 
more YOS are less likely to opt-in. 
Next, we examine member’s expected YOS under both retirement 
systems. Each panel in Figure 1 contains three Kaplan-Meier survival 
2For instance, a military member who decided not to save in the TSP and obtained 
greater returns on his personal investments than TSP participants could prefer to 
remain in the High-3 plan.
3The survey can be found at: http://faculty.nps.edu/aamenich/Papers/MRS_
Survey.pdf.
Table 1: Summary statistics of the sample and the survey population.
Samples
Survey participants Survey non-participants
(1) (2)
Mean (s.e.) Mean (s.e.)
Male 0.90 (0.01) 0.92 (0.00)
Single 0.41 (0.01) 0.56 (0.00)
Age 26.43 (0.08) 23.94 (0.02)
Officer 0.23 (0.01) 0.07 (0.00)
Years of service 7.89 (0.06) 6.03 (0.02)
White 0.81 (0.01) 0.82 (0.00)
Black 0.08 (0.01) 0.09 (0.00)
Other race 0.11 (0.01) 0.09 (0.00)
High school diploma 0.76 (0.01) 0.92 (0.00)
Bachelor’s degree or 
higher 0.24 (0.01) 0.08 (0.00)
Combat arms 0.17 (0.01) 0.26 (0.00)
Combat service 
support 0.52 (0.01) 0.45 (0.00)




68.70 (0.46) 63.19 (0.11)
Observations 1,948 26,106
Notes: The armed forces qualifying test is only taken by enlisted personnel. 
Combat arms, combat service support and aviation are exhaustive categories of 
occupations.
Table 2: Probit regressions explaining the preference for opting-in to the new 
retirement system.
Samples All Enlisted only Officers only
Outcomes
Opt-in to the MRS Opt-in to the MRS Opt-in to the MRS
(1) (2) (3)
Marginal effect (s.e.) Marginal effect (s.e.) Marginal effect (s.e.)
Officer -0.609*** (0.161) -- --
Male -0.049 (0.038) -0.039 (0.043) -0.099 (0.067)
Married 0.016 (0.024) 0.042 (0.029) -0.054* (0.030)
Age 0.007 (0.005) 0.012* (0.006) -0.010 (0.009)
Years of 
service -0.041*** (0.006) -0.049*** (0.008) -0.010 (0.010)
Black 0.013 (0.040) 0.028 (0.046) -0.054 (0.040)




-0.071 (0.058) -0.136** (0.068) 0.032 (0.049)
Combat service 
support 0.033 (0.031) 0.051 (0.037) -0.033 (0.034)




0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) --
Observations 1,948 1,502 446
Mean opt-in 
rate 0.326 0.390 0.112
Notes: The armed forces qualifying test is only taken by enlisted personnel; in 
column 1, it is imputed with a constant for officers. Omitted variables include white 
race. High school diploma and combat arms occupation category.
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curves for expected YOS (YOS are top-coded at 20): under (i) the 
current system, (ii) the MRS, and (iii) the respondents’ preferred system 
(“choice cohort”). The MRS survival curve is an estimate of retention 
rates for future military members who will enter post-20184 and the 
choice cohort survival curve is an estimate of retention behavior of 
cohorts serving during the 2017 transition period. The general shape of 
all curves is the same: the flat initial years of the survival curves reflect 
the obligations of initial service contracts, the relatively high negative 
slope up to 10 YOS reflects individuals selecting out of or settling into 
their military career, and the relatively flat curves after 15 YOS reflect 
the high value of vesting one’s pension5.
Under the MRS, expected retention rates of enlisted personnel 
(Panel B) are higher for all YOS between 5 and 15. For officers (Panel 
C), retention rates under the MRS are similar to the current system 
below YOS 12. At YOS 12, retention sharply declines under the MRS, 
which suggests that a larger retention bonus at YOS 12 might be needed 
to maintain current retention rates.
Figure 2 decomposes the survival curves for the choice cohort into 
those who would opt-in to MRS and those who would not. Enlisted 
personnel (Panel B) who opt-in is slightly more inclined to remain in 
service early in their careers, and approximately 10 percentage points 
more likely to leave service around YOS 15. Officers (Panel C) who opt-
4This assumes that the change of retirement systems will not influence who enters 
the military.
5Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests confirm the distributions of expected YOS are 
significantly different
across all groups other than for officers between the current system and the choice 
cohort.
 
Notes: Expected years of service above 20 are coded as 20 YOS. 
MRS=Modernized Retirement System.
Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier survival curves of expected years of service under the 
current system, under the MRS, and for the choice cohort under their preferred 
system.
  
Notes: Expected years of service above 20 are coded as 20 YOS. 
MRS=Modernized Retirement System.
Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier survival curves for the choice cohort, by preferred 
retirement system.    
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in are planning to stay considerably less than those choosing to stay in 
the current system.
Conclusion
Proponents of the MRS highlight the likely reduction in retirement 
costs to the government; however, total costs necessarily include any 
costs associated with changes in turnover. We provide the first empirical 
estimates of future turnover under the MRS, and show that it will likely 
be larger than under the current system. 
Our study has the following limitations. First, our data do not 
contain information on on-the-job service member quality (e.g., time-
to-promotion), and thus we are not able to empirically study whether 
the MRS will change the quality of service members who both enter 
and persist in the military; clearly, service member quality could be 
an even more important consideration than turnover from an overall 
organizational perspective. Second, survey participants were not 
incentivized to respond truthfully, which could lead to inaccurate 
responses. Third, our sample of USA Marines may not be fully 
representative of the entire USA armed forces, reducing the external 
validity of our results. We encourage future research that addresses 
these issues, and explores ways to quantify the full cost impacts of the 
forthcoming policy change. 
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